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Eric Brousseau - The Economics of Contracts-Theories and Applications

Annotation
Part I: Introduction
1 Introduction
2 The central role of the notion of the contract in economic analysis
3 Three principal currents
3.1 Origins
3.2 Incentive theory
3.3 Incomplete contract theory
3.4 The new institutional transaction costs theory
3.5 The three base models and their ramifications
NOTES
Part II: Contracts, Organizations, and Institutions
Chapter 2: The New Institutional Economics
Ronald Coase
Overview
Note
Chapter 3: Contract and Economic Organization
1 Introduction
2 Obstacles
3 Growing discontent
4 Fashioning a response
4.1 Human actors
4.2 Unit of analysis
4.3 Operationalization
4.4 Additional features
5 Looking ahead
6 Concluding remarks
Notes
Chapter 4: The Role of Incomplete Contracts in
1 Introduction
2 Incomplete contracts
3 Self-enforcing arrangements
4 Contract terms complement self-enforcement
5 The self-enforcing range of contractual relationships
6 Vertical integration
7 Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 5: Entrepreneurship, Transaction-Cost
1 Introduction
2 Profit-seeking in a neoinstitutional environment
3 The process of decision-making
4 The firm's property-rights structure
5 The concept ofefficiency
6 Concluding thoughts
Notes
Chapter 6: The Contract as Economic Trade
1 Introduction
1.1 A contract as a legal concept
1.2 The contract domain
1.3 Unique concept of contract
1.4 Trade
1.5 Reciprocated transfer
1.6 The meeting of minds
2 The meeting of minds, an essential subjective aspect of the
2.1 The contract is a meeting of minds designed to carry legal weight
2.2 The binding force of the contract depends upon its compliance with objective law
3 Utility and justice are the ultimate aims of the contract
3.1 The contract is binding only because it is useful
3.1.1 The subordinate principle of legal security
3.1.2 The subordinate principle of cooperation
3.2 The contract is binding only if it is just
3.2.1 The pursuit of equality of benefits
3.2.2 The pursuit of equality of the parties
Notes
Chapter 7: Contract Theory and Theories of
1 Introduction
2 The substantive function
3 The institutional aspect of contract regulation
3.1 What is possible?
3.2 What is desirable?
Notes
Chapter 8: Economic Reasoning and The Framing
1 Introduction
2 Mattei v. Hopper
3 Bloor v. Falstaff[12]
4 Concluding remarks
Notes
Chapter 9: A Transactions-Costs Approach to the
1 Introduction
2 Property rights: general concepts
3 Transaction-costs issues in the assignment and modification of property-rights adjustment: equity issues
4 Transaction-costs issues in the assignment and modification of property-rights: measurement issues
5 Equity and measurement issues in property-rights definition and change: oil-field unitization
5.1 The benefits of unit agreement: the incentive to assign property rights
5.2 Equity and measurement problems in unitization negotiations
Notes
Part IV: Theoretical Developments—Where do we Stand?
Chapter 10: Transaction Costs and Incentive
1 Introduction
2 The rent-efficiency trade-off: a procurement example
3 The ideal world of the Revelation Principle
4 Contractual externalities and transaction costs
4.1 Vertical collusion
4.2 Delegation
4.3 Multiprincipals
4.3.1 The case of complements
4.3.2 The case of substitutes
4.4 Renegotiation
4.5 Biased principals
5 Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 11: Norms and The Theory of the Firm
1 Introduction
3 Modeling difficulties
4 Norms and firm boundaries
5 The role of formal contracts
Notes
Chapter 12: Allocating Decision Rights Under
1 Introduction
2 The basic framework
2.1 Preferences and actions
2.2 Contracting
2.3 Renegotiation game
2.4 Timing
3 The optimality of "decision-rights" contracts
3.1 Benchmark case: no wealth constraint
3.2 Simple contracts under wealth constraints
Proposition 1
Example 1
4 The determinants of control allocation
4.1 Limited wealth and ex post negotiation
Example 2
4.2 Limited liability and participation constraints
Example 3
Example 4
5 Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 13: Complexity and Contract
1 Introduction
2 Contracting scenarios
2.1 Agency theory
Figure 13.1: Time line for agency relationship
2.2 Hold-up
Figure 13.2: Time line for hold-up problem
2.3 Authority
Figure 13.3: Time line for authority relationship
2.3 Ex post hold-up
Figure 13.4: Time line for ex post hold-up
2.5 State-contingent contracts and complexity
3 The sales contract revisited: ex ante governance
Proposition 2
Proposition 3
4 Judgment and subjective performance evaluation
4.1 Subjective contracting
5 Discussion
Notes
Chapter 14: Authority, as Flexibility, is at the Core
1 Introduction
2 Decision, irreversibility, and information
Figure 14.1: Highway construction
3 Contract, irreversibility, and information
Figure 14.2: Simon's model
4 Conclusion
Chapter 15: Positive Agency Theory-Place and
1 Introduction
2 The principal components of PAT
2.1 The building blocks of the theory
2.2 A theory of the organizational structure and distribution of the organizational
2.2.1 Organizational architecture
2.2.2 Distribution of organizational forms
3 PAT compared with TCT: a second reading of Williamson
3.1 The common points: a critical discussion
3.1.1 The first common point: the managerial discretion framework
3.1.2 The second common point: contractual efficiency
3.2 The differences: a critical debate
3.2.1 The main differences: the analysis unit, the nature of costs,
3.2.2 The secondary differences: the nature of the processes and
3.3 A revised comparative assessment
4 Contributions and influence of positive agency theory
4.1 The four main axes of the PAT research program
4.2 Methodological contribution of positive agency theory
5 Conclusions
Notes
Part V: Testing Contract Theories
Chapter 16: Econometrics of Contracts-An
1 Introduction
2 Why contract?
2.1 Structure and estimation
2.1.1 The contracting decision
2.1.2 Contract duration
2.2 Predictions
2.2.1 Agency theory
2.2.2 Transaction-cost economics
2.3 Evidence
2.3.1 Agency theory
2.3.2 Transaction-cost economics
3 Contract design
3.1 Specification and estimation
3.2 Predictions
3.2.1 Agency theory
3.2.2 Transaction-cost economics
3.3 Evidence
3.3.1 Agency theory
3.3.2 Transaction-cost economics
4 Contracting versus vertical integration
4.1 Agency theory
4.2 Transaction-cost economics
5 Some cautionary notes
Notes
Chapter 17: Experiments on Moral Hazard and
1 Introduction
2 Experiments with a mechanism to induce preferences
2.1 Design and theoretical predictions
2.2 Results and limitations
2.3Taking the agent's potential rejection into account
3 The principal's behavior in one-shot interactions
3.1 Design and theoretical predictions
3.2 Results and interpretation
3.3 Validation of these principles
4 Contract offers and effort in repeated interaction
4.1 The experiment by Güth et al. (1998)
4.1.1 Design and theoretical predictions
4.1.2 Results
4.2 The experiment by Anderhub, Gächter and Königstein (1999)
4.2.1 Design and theoretical prediction
4.2.2 Results
5 Conclusion
Notes
Part VI: Applied Issues-Contributions to Industrial Organization
Chapter 18: Residual Claims and Self-enforcement
1 Introduction
2 Defining franchising
3 Residual claims and on-going rent as incentive mechanisms
3.1 Residual claims in franchising
3.2 Self-enforcement
4 Substitutes or complements?
5 Specific contract terms and implementation
5.1 Franchise contract terms supporting franchisees' residual claimant status
5.2 Franchise contract terms supporting the self-enforcement mechanism
5.2.1 Increasing expected rent (W2 t)
5.2.2 Restricting the gains from deviation (W1 t)
6 Non-franchised systems with common mark or reputation concerns
7 Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 19: The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large
1 Introduction
1.1 The problem
1.2 Asymmetric contracting
2 Explicit contracting
2.1 Contractual conditions
2.1.1 First negotiation
2.1.2 Contract terms
2.1.3 Payment period
2.1.4 Legal formalization
2.2 Annual revision of contracts
2 Explicit contracting
2.1 Contractual conditions
2.1.1 First negotiation
2.1.2 Contract terms
2.1.3 Payment period
2.1.4 Legal formalization
2.2 Annual revision of contracts
4 Sources of conflict
5 Disciplinary mechanisms
5.1 Payment delay as safeguard and sanction
5.2 Explicit sanctions: discounts for inexact debits
5.3 Quasi-judicial taxes
5.4 Merchandise returns
5.5 Breaking off and cooling of relations
6 Safeguards and regulation
6.1 The efficient safeguard is imperfect
6.2 No clear scope for regulation
7 Summary
Notes
Chapter 20: Interconnection Agreements in Telecommunications Networks—From Strategic Behaviors to Property Rights
1 Introduction
2 Interconnection agreements as a strategic game
2.1 Asymmetric interconnection and essential facilities
2.1.1 The access to an essential facility
2.1.2 Access regulation
2.2 Symmetric interconnection and compatibility
2.2.1 Competition and compatibility
2.2.2 Financial transfers and collusion
3 Contract theory and interconnection
3.1 Network evolution, property rights, and rights of usage
3.2 Institutions, transaction costs, and assignment of property rights
3.3 Modularization and assignment of property rights in voice networks
3.4 Ownership-rights assignment for data networks
4 Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 21: Licensing in the Chemical Industry
1 Introduction
2 Review of the economic literature on licensing contract
3 The role of patents as a transaction-cost reducing
4 The market for chemical process technology
5 Specialized engineering firms and division of labor
6 Licensing by chemical firms
6.1 Empirical evidence
6.2 Why is there so much licensing by chemical producers?
7 Why in chemicals?
8 Conclusions
Notes
Part VII: Policy Issues—Anti-Trust and Regulation of Public Utilities
Chapter 22: Inter-company Agreements and EC
1 Introduction
2 A voluntarist concept of the promotion of technical progress
2.1 Block exemption to certain categories of technology transfer agreements
2.1.1 Agreements covered by the new exemption: regulation 240/96
2.1.2 Contractual clauses concerned in this new regulation
2.2 An analysis of requests for individual exemption in accordance with
2.2.1 Conditions for individual exemption from the provisions of
2.2.2 A new analysis procedure of joint venture creation projects
3 Conditional freedom of vertical agreements: new category
3.1 Vertical contracts and efficiency promotion
3.1.1 Vertical restrictions and brand protection
3.1.2 Time coordination of suppliers' and distributors' investments
3.1.3 Territorial protection, promotion of inter-brand competition,
3.2 Validation conditions of vertical contracts
3.2.1 Maintaining sufficient intra-brand competition
3.2.2 Maintaining efficient inter-brand competition
4 Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 23: Incentive Contracts in Utility
1 Introduction
2 Public ownership, cost of service, and incentives in regulation
2.1 Problems and solutions for natural monopolies
2.2 Cost of service regulation
2.3 Introduction of incentive contracts
3 Development of incentive contracts
3.1 Incentive contracts and introduction of price caps
3.2 Practical questions in incentive regulation of monopolies
3.3 Strategic behavior by firm and regulator
4 Incentive regulation and competition
4.1 Industry structure
4.2 Access pricing, bypass, and cross-subsidies
4.3 Competition in telecoms networks
4.4 Competition and distributive concerns
5 Conclusions
Notes
Chapter 24: Contractual Choice and Performance-
1 Introduction
2 Contractual arrangements: characteristics of our sample
3 Our analytical framework
Proposition 1
Proposition 2
Proposition 3
4 The choice of the mode of governance: our variables
4.1 Investments
4.1.1 Properties of raw water
4.1.2 Origin of water
4.1.3 Population affected
4.2 Uncertainty
4.3 Financial constraints
4.4 Performance
4.5 Checklist of our variables
5 Results
5.1 Determinants of contractual choice
5.2 Mode of governance and performance
6 Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 25: Institutional or Structural—Lessons
1 Introduction
2 The utilities' problem: regulatory governance and regulatory incentives[1]
2.1 The political profitability of expropriation
2.2 The implications of government opportunism
2.3 Sources of regulatory commitment
2.4 Institutional endowment[18]
3 "Optimal" restructuring myths in the electricity industry
3.1 Transmission investment
3.2 Generation markets
3.3 Distribution investment
3.4 Summary
4 Regulatory responses to market power allegations in the
4.1 Market power and regulatory reform in the United Kingdom
4.2 Market power and regulatory reform in California
4.3 Market power and regulatory reform in El Salvador
5 Final comments
Notes
Chapter 26: Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition—A Transactions-Cost
1 Introduction
2 Basic characteristics of electricity supply and demand
3 Performance problems with regulated electricity monopolies
4 The basic reform model[19]
Figure 26.1: Competitive wholesale and retail markets
5 Performance improvements resulting from recent electricity sector reforms
6 Problems encountered by reforms
6.1 Local market power problems
6.2 Management of network congestion
6.3 Market power problems when supplies of generating capacity are tight
6.4 Coordination of transmission and generation investments
7 Conclusions
Notes
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Eric Brousseau - The Economics of Contracts-Theories and Applications

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